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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM MICHAEL POSSO,
Applicant/Respondent,
vs.
CHERNE CONSTRUCTION, defendant
employer and WAUSAU INSURANCE
COMPANY, defendant insurer,
No. 860091
Defendants/Applicants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
CHERNE CONSTRUCTION
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the Industrial Commission erred when it
determined that the "special hazard" exception to the "going
and coming" rule applied in this case.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is
dispositive or determinative of the case at hand.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case.

This matter is before the Court on

a Writ of Review of an Order of the Industrial Commission
awarding benefits to the applicant, William Michael Posso, who
was injured as a result of an automobile/motorcycle accident
near the IPP Power Plant north of Delta, Utah.

The applicant

made a claim for worker's compensation benefits as a result of
this accident and the injuries he received.

Essentially, the

applicant argued that he should be entitled to worker's
compensation benefits because the injury occurred on his way
home from work.

Subsequently, the defendant Cherne

Construction Company moved for a review of the Administrative
Law Judgefs decision.

The Order of the Industrial Commission

denying the Motion for Review was passed by the Industrial
Commission on the 16th day of January, 1986. As a consequence,
this matter is before the Court on the Writ of Review.
Statement of Facts.
The applicant, William Michael Posso, was injured on
August 4, 1984, in an automobile/motorcycle accident on Brush
Wellman Road, in Millard County, Utah. (R. 27, 31-32)
On the date of the accident, Mr. Posso was employed
by Cherne Construction Corp., also known as Cherne
Construction. (R. 2 6)
The applicant was a construction laborer for Cherne
Construction at the IPP Power Plant north of Delta, Utah,
located just off the Brush Wellman Road. (R. 27)
Approximately 3:30 p.m. on the date of the accident,
the plaintiff completed his job duties at the IPP Plant.

He

turned in his employee badge at approximately 3:35 p.m. and was
not intending to perform any other work duties that day. (R.
28-29)
The applicant then went to the parking lot to get on
his motorcycle in order go home, to Delta, Utah,, He exited the
IPP Plant and intended to travel east on Brush Wellman Road to
where it intersects with highway 6.
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He then intended to travel

south on highway 6 to Delta. (R. 30, 40, 47)
While traveling on Brush Wellman Road the applicant
attempted to pass a vehicle which was turning left into the
man-camp near the IPP Plant and subsequently the accident
occurred. (R. 31-32)
Brush Wellman Road is a public highway maintained by
Millard County. (R. 66-67)
The Brush Wellman Road at the entrance to the
man-camp has been widened into a four (4) lane highway. (R.
36-37)
Brush Wellman Road was not the exclusive access to
the IPP Plant.

In fact, there were at least two other access

roads to the plant. (R. 36, 39, 46-47)
Brush Wellman Road was not used exclusively by
workers at the IPP Plant nor did it pass through the IPP Plant
itself. (R. 36, 39)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There is only one major issue to be resolved in this
particular case:

Did the applicant, William Michael Posso,

sustain his injury in the course of his employment?

As stated

above, it appears that Mr. Posso was injured on his motorcycle
on his way home from work on August 4, 1984.

It is the general

rule that travel to and from work is not normally considered to
be in the course of an employee's employment.

There are,

however, certain exceptions to this rule, which is commonly
referred to as the "going and coming" rule.

Specifically, an

employee may recover worker's compensation benefits as a result
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of an injury received while he is going or coming from work if
the injury incurrs either "on the premises" of the employer or
if the route which the employee must travel to and from work
presents a "special hazard" to travel, thus becoming a special
hazard of employment.

It is undisputed in this case that the

accident in question did not occur on the premises of the
employer, Cherne Construction.

Consequently, the only issue in

this case is whether or not the "special hazard" exception to
the "going and coming" rule applies.
There are a number of cases in Utah which set out and
explain the going and coming rule and the applicable exceptions
to the rule. A careful examination of those cases yields the
inescapable conclusion that there was no special hazard to Mr.
Posso as contemplated by law.

Further, it is apparent that Mr.

Posso cannot satisfy all of the requirements of the special
hazard test which has been set out by the Utah Supreme Court.
Finally, extension of the "special hazard" exception to the
facts of this case will enlarge the exceptions to the "going
and coming" rule to the point that the exceptions swallow the
rule.

Specifically, to allow Mr. Posso to obtain workman's

compensation benefits as a result of the accident in this case
will in effect vitiate the going and coming rule.

There can

be, if benefits are extended in this case, no distinction
between the accident in the case at hand and any other accident
that an employee encounters on the way to or from his or her
place of business as a result of congestion or a busy
intersection.

As a consequence, it would be improper for the
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Court to sustain the finding of the Industrial Commission.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED WHEN IT
DETERMINED THAT MR. POSSO WAS INJURED IN
THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
A.

History of the Special Hazard Exception.

Unless the injuries of William Michael Posso can be
considered to have arisen out of or in the course of his
employment, workman's compensation benefits should be denied.
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 (1953 as amended) specifically
states that an employee is entitled to benefits if his injury
is caused "by accident arising out of or in the course of his
employment . . . ." The question in this case is whether or
not his injury occurred during the course of his employment.
The particular issue in this case is whether or not the
circumstances surrounding Mr. Posso1s accident amount to an
exception to what has been called the "going and coming" rule.
Generally, workmen's compensation benefits are not afforded to
employees injured while traveling to and from work.

See,

e.g. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 8 P.2d
617, 618 (Utah 1932).

There are however, some exceptions to

the going and coming rule which have been recognized by the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
As long ago as 1938 the Supreme Court of this State
has determined that if a workman was injured in the normal
course of things, while going to or coming from his or her
place of employment, such an accident was the result of the
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general hazards which all must meet and assume and consequently
was not in the course of employment.

Vitagraph, Inc. v.

Industrial Commission, 85 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1938).

The

Court in Vitagraph called this the "plant" rule; that is,
under this rule the employee does not actually become attached
to his employment until he arrives at the plant or place of his
employment and he is not in employment after he leaves the
plant or place of employment.

Id.at 603.

Two cases, Bountiful Brick Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 68 Utah 600 251 P.555, affirmed 276 U.S. 154, 48
S. Ct. 221, 72 L. Ed. 507 (1927), and Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 161, 207 P.148, affirmed 263
U.S. 418, 44 S. Ct. 143, and 68 L. Ed. 366 (1923), carve out an
exception to the "going and coming" rule.

In both Cudahy and

Bountiful Brick Co., while on the way to work and within 100
feet or less of the place of employment, the decedent in each
case was struck and killed by a train.

In both cases, the

proximity of the risk to the place of employment and the fact
that the risk was regularly encountered by the employees of the
business, whereas the public encountered the risk only
occasionally, were controlling.

It appeared under the facts of

Cudahy that it was necessary for each employee to enter the
plant over a particular road, which was the only road leading
to the plant.

Evidently, the Court predicated its decision in

Cudahy, allowing benefits, upon the inference that the danger
incident to crossing the railroad track, by reason of its
location and proximity to the packing plant and the necessity
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of crossing it, must have been within the contemplation of the
parties, that is the employer and the employee at the time of
employee and as a incident thereto.

Basically, the Court

determined that the employer's control over the employee was
extended beyond the actual confines of the plant to the road
that the employee was required to use as a place of danger,
that is the railroad track.
A similar decision was reached in Bountiful Brick.
In that case, the Court extended benefits to the decedent's
dependants.

The decedent crossed railroad tracks by foot to

his place of business at a point where an opening in the
plaintiff's fence was made in order to accommodate the ingress
of plant employees.

The Court stated that "by virtue of his

employment [the employee] was . . . peculiarly and abnormally
exposed to a common peril." Obviously, the Court determined
that by being forced to cross a railroad track between fences
on a daily basis the decedent was regularly exposed to a perial
not encountered by the public at large.

It is interesting to

note that in both Bountiful Brick and Cudahy, the decedents
were struck and killed by a train while on their way to work
and within 100 feet or less of their place of employment.

In

both cases, the proximity of the risk to the place of
employment and the fact that the risk was regularly encountered
by the employees of the business, whereas the public
encountered the risk only occasionally, were controlling.
However, this Court has more recently clarified the
"special hazard" exception to the going and coming rule in the
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case of Soldier Creek Coal Co, v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165 (Utah
1985).

In that case the claimant's deceased, Mr. Bailey, was

employed by a coal company 17 miles from his home in Price,
Utah.

There was only one road leading to the mine.

From the

mine the road continued on to Myton and serviced a number of
ranches on that portion of the road.

At any rate, the

plaintiff was thrown from his pickup truck less than a third of
a mile from the place of employment.

The claimant alleged that

the accident occurred because of a special hazard imposed by
the road that serviced the mine site.

Specifically, the

Industrial Commission concluded that the condition of the road,
which consisted of an inclined sharp right hand curve, posed a
special hazard of employment.

As a consequence, it determined

that the accident was compensable.

The Supreme Court of the

State of Utah reversed and in so doing set out the elements of
the "special hazard" exception to the going and coming rule
which must be met before an accident can be considered
compensable.
The Court determined that:
The commonest ground of extension [of the
premises rule] is that the off-premises
point at which the injury occurred lies on
the only route, or at least on the normal
route, which employees must traverse to
reach the plant, and therefore the special
hazards of the route become the hazards of
employment.
Id. at 1166, citing 1 A. Larsen, The Law of Workmen's
Compensation §15.13 (1985).

The Court went on to set out

the four requirements that must be met before the special
hazards exception to the going and coming rule can be met.
8

First, there must be a close association between the route
taken by the employee and the employer's premises, which
usually means that the route must be the "only" route to the
work place.

Second, there must be an identifiable special

hazard associated with the route.

Third, the employee must be

exposed to the special hazard as a result of his use of that
route.

Finally, the special hazard must be the proximate cause

of the accident.

The claimant simply cannot meet any of the

requirements set out above.
B.

The Special Hazard Exception Does Not

Apply to this Case.
As stated in Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey,
supra., at 1166, there is a four-prong test that must be
satisfied.

The first prong of that test is that "there must be

a close association of the access way with the employer's
premises, usually meaning that it must be the only route to the
work place . . . ."

It was well established at the hearing of

this matter that in fact there were at least two other routes
available to enter or leave at the IPP Plant.

Although Cherne

Construction concedes that the Brush Wellman Road was the most
normally used access route to the IPP Plant, it does not
concede that there is such a close association with the IPP
Plant, as contemplated under Utah law, as to bring it within
the special hazard exception to the going and coming rule.
Specifically, although the Brush Wellman Road was the primary
access point to the IPP Plant itself the Brush Wellman Road
also was used by workers from other businesses on the road as
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well as the general public.

What is particularly interesting

about this case and what militates against the claimant's
assertion that the highway has a close association with the
employer's premises is the fact that the accident in question
occurred at a place on the highway which had absolutely no
connection whatsoever to the means of ingress or egress to the
claimant's place of employment.

The facts were otherwise in

Cudahy and Bountiful Brick; supra.
The second prong of the test as set out in Soldier
Creek Coal Company v. Bailey, is that "there must be a special
hazard associated with this route . . . ." Id. cit 1166.
Notwithstanding the finding of the Administrative Law Judge
that there was a special hazard and notwithstanding the
concurrence of the Industrial Commission with the
Administrative Law Judge in denying the defendant's Motion for
Review, no special hazard, as contemplated under Utah law,
existed.

Specifically, the Administrative Law Judge found that

there was a hazard created by the employment itself.

The

Administrative Law Judge stated in her discussion that:
"[t]he applicant would not have been
traveling on that heavily congested road
for any reason but to go to or depart from
his employment. . . . No matter what road
the applicant chose to take back to Delta,
he would still have been subjected at some
point to the heavy traffic on the Brush
Wellman Road along the IPP site. The fact
that the applicant was actually struck by
another IPP employee turning into the
employer owned man-camp is another
consideration to which the Administrative
Law Judge gives considerable weight. The
Administrative Law Judge is satisfied that
there is a distinct causal connection
between the condition under which the
10

applicant had to leave the premises and
the occurrence of the injury, and feels
that it would be a grave injustice not to
extend coverage in this matter." (R. 123)
These statements by the Administrative Law Judge are in direct
contravention to the testimony of the applicant himself.

The

applicant was asked:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

How was traffic that afternoon?
It was light.
The traffic was light, but there was other traffic on
the road; is that right?
That's correct.
Beyond the fact that there was other traffic on the

road consisting of some other employees from the IPP Plant,
there was no showing whatsoever that the traffic was unusually
heavy or that it presented any special hazard.

The

Administrative Law Judge's findings as well as the findings of
the Industrial Commission are completely gratuitous, just as
the findings of the Industrial Commission in Soldier Creek
Coal Company v. Bailey, supra. were gratuitous.

In that

case, the Court overturned the commission's ruling that the
deceased was exposed to a "special hazard" because he was
killed when his vehicle overturned on a graded sharp turn.
Likewise, in that case, the commission noted that it was common
knowledge that roads to and from coal mines were normally
covered with loose coal and debris and that under those
circumstances it was clear that the claimant's death was a
result of a special hazard presented by the road to the mine.
The Supreme Court reversed and noted that there were no
findings to support the evidence, likewise, there are no
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findings of fact in this case which would support the
Administrative Law Judge's finding that there was a special
hazard associated with the route.

Further, the Industrial

Commission itself stated that there is no Utah law on whether
heavy traffic can be considered a special hazard.

The

Commission determined unilaterally, without considering other
factors, that the applicant was exposed to a "special hazard."
Such a finding is not supported by the evidence,,
The third prong of the test states that "the employee
must be exposed to the special hazard because of his use of the
route . . . ." Id. at 1166. Assuming that there was a
special hazard associated with the route, and assuming that
that special hazard was the congested nature of the Brush
Wellman Road, then the applicant clearly falls short of
satisfying the third requirement of the special hazard
exception to the going and coming rule.

By the applicant's own

testimony, as stated above, traffic on that particular
afternoon on the Brush Wellman Road was in the applicant's
words, "light."

(R. 31). No other argument on this particular

point is required.

The fact is, Mr. Posso was not exposed to

any special hazard.
Finally, the fourth prong of the test as set out by
this Court is that "the special hazard must be the proximate
cause of the accident." Id. at 1166. Again, the claimant,
William Michael Posso, cannot meet his burden by showing that
the special hazard was the proximate cause of the accident.
The facts are undisputed, the applicant states:
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As I got approximately, oh, 100 to 150
yards away from the car, I noticed that it
was slowing almost to a stop and the
blazer was still on my right and I could
not go into the other lane, so I attempted
to pass the car on the left and as I
turned into the west bound lane to go
around the car, it turned into me.
(R.32).

As stated before, the facts show that William Michael

Posso was following another vehicle in the inside east bound
lane on the Brush Wellman Road leaving work.

The vehicle in

front of him slowed down in order to turn into the man-camp.
The vehicle beside him did not allow Michael Posso to move over
to the right in order to pass the car in front of him.

As a

consequence, Mr. Posso determined that he would pass the
vehicle on its left.

The exhibits D3, D4 and D5, which are

part of the record on appeal, clearly show Brush Wellman Road
at the entrance to the man-camp.

Those photographs also show

that the four-lane highway is divided by a double yellow line
in the middle.

Mr. Posso clearly improperly attempted to pass

the vehicle that was slowing down in front of him.

It cannot

possibly be stated that heavy traffic or a congested Brush
Wellman Road were the proximate cause of the applicant's
injuries.

As a consequence, it is clear, particularly in light

of Soldier Creek Coal Company v. Bailey, supra, that the
applicant cannot show a "special hazard" exception to the going
and coming rule.
CONCLUSION
The defendant, Cherne Construction, urges this Court
to reverse the decision of the Industrial Commission on the
grounds that there is no applicable exception to the going and
13

coming rule and upon the policy grounds to allow benefits in
this case would eliminate a reasonable and well established
rule in the State of Utah.
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